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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In his autobiography, John Stuart Mill states that On 
Liberty was likely to survive longer than anything else he 
1 
had written. From the vantage point of the present, it 
would seem that Mill was correct in his estimation of the 
future of his essay. It is safe to say that On Liberty is 
Mill's most famous work. However, there does not seem to 
be a concensus among scholars about the ultimate basis for 
Mill's defense of freedom in: On: Liberty. There are those 
who contend that the ultimate basis for Mill's argument in 
On Liberty is his concern for self-development or individ- , 
uality. Then, there are those who argue that what Mill 
presents in: On: Liberty is really a defense of individuality 
and freedom based on Mill's version of utilitarianism. 
This difference of opinion has its basis in a paradox. 
This paradox is based on what appears to be Mill's commit-
ment to two seemingly inconsistent principles. At times one 
is led to believe that thP. highest and controlling principle 
for Mill is found in utilitarianism. At other times, however, 
1John Stuart Mill, Autobiography of John Stuart Mill 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), p. 177. 
1 
2 
one feels that the ultimate end for Mill is self-development. 
What I hope to do in this thesis is to examine this 
paradox and some possible solutions to it. Finally, I shall 
present some conclusions upon this issue. 
CHAPTER II 
MILL'S UTILITARIANISM 
Mill explicitly professed his commitment to utilitar-
ianism as his highest and controlling principle throughout 
his life. In his autobiography, which was written after On 
Liberty, Mill expresses his commitment to utilitarianism: 
"I never, indeed, waivered in the conviction that happiness 
is the test of all rules of conduct, and the end of life."2 
Indeed, in On Liberty itself, Mill expresses his allegiance 
to utilitarianism: 
It is proper to state that I forgo any advantage 
which could be derived to my argument from the idea 
of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. 
I regard ujility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical 
questions. 
Mill presents the principles of his notions about 
social utility in Utilitarianism: 
The creed which accepts as the foundation of 
morals "utility" or the "greatest happiness prin-
ciple" holds that actions are right in proportion 
as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they 
tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By 
happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of 
pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of 
pleasure ... namely, that pleasure and freedom 
2Ibid. , p. 100. 
3John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1947), p. 10. 
3 
from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and 
that all desirable things (which are as numerous in 
the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable 
either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as 
means to4the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain. 
Mill points out that the true utilitarian standard is 
4 
not so much concerned for the individual's own greatest hap-
piness, but the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest 
5 
number. 
Up to this point, Mill's views on utilitarianism are 
not unlike those of his father, James Mill, and Jeremy Ben-
tham. However, as one reads on in Utilitarianism, one 
begins to realize how different John Stuart Mill's notions 
about the utility principle are from those of his father and 
Bentham. Bentham only recognized quantitative differences 
between pleasures based on such factors as intensity and 
duration. John Stuart Mill, however, speaks of qualitative 
differences between pleasures. To determine what makes one 
pleasure of a greater quality and value than another, Mill 
says: "Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or 
almost all who have experience of both give a decided pref-
erence, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to 
4Idem, Utilitarianism, ed. by Oskar Piest (Indianapo-
lis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1957), pp. 10-11. 
5Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
5 
prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure."6 Mill then 
states that those who are equally acquainted with and equal-
ly capable of appreciating and enjoying both do give a 
decided preference to the manner of existence which employs 
their higher faculties. 7 Mill seems to have a special re-
gard for those capable of experiencing the nhigher pleasures." 
'It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig 
satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool 
8 
satisfied.n 
In the last chapter of Utilitarianism, Mill expresses 
the view which he lays out also in his Autobiography and his 
Essay On Bentham, that it is not inconsistent with the prin-
ciples of utility to seek an end other than happiness. Mill 
makes clear, however, that all ends desired for themselves 
are ultimately desired only because of their connection to 
happiness. So ultimately it is still happiness which is 
desired as the highest end. 9 
6
rbid., p. 12. 
7rbid., p. 12. 
8rbid. , p. 14. 
9rbid., pp. 48-49. 
CHAPTER III 
PARADOX OF ON LIBERTY--INDIVIDUALITY OR UTILITY? 
With this background of Mill's version of utilitarian-
ism, we can now examine the question of whether, in On 
Liberty, Mill abandons his commitment to utilitarianism 
and sets up the development of individuality as his highest 
and controlling principle. To begin with, I think it is 
important to note that Mill's concern for individuality and 
freedom is not to be found only in On Liher·ty. In his 
Principles of Political Economy, for example, Mill shows 
a concern for the free development of individuality. Mill 
in the Principles of Political Economy discusses the rela-
tive value of a free enterprise economic system. Much of 
the discussion seems strongly reminiscent of that expressed 
in On Liberty. 
. . . We are too ignorant either of what individual 
agency in its best form, or Socialism in its best 
form, can accomplish, to be qualified to decide 
which of the two will be the ultimate form of human 
society. 
If a conjecture may be hazarded, the decision 
will probably depend mainly on one consideration, 
viz. which of the two systems is consistent with 
the greatest amount of human liberty and spontan-
eity. After the means of subsistence are assured, 
the next in strength of the personal wants of human 
beings is liberty; and (unlike the physical wants, 
which as civilization advances become more moderate 
and more amenable to control) it increases instead 
of diminishing in intensity as the intelligence and 
6 
the moral faculties are more developed. The per-
fection both of social arrangements and of practical 
morality would be, to secure to all persons complete 
independence and freedom of action, subject to no 
restriction but that of not doing injury to others: 
and the education which taught or the social insti-
tutions which required them to exchange the control 
of their own actions for any amount of comfort or 
affluence, or to renounce liberty for the sake of 
equality, would deprive them of one of the most 
elevated characteristics of human nature.lO 
7 
It is in On Liberty where Mill presents his most de-
veloped argument concerning the development of individuality. 
A strong motivation behind Mill's defense of the free devel-
opment of individuality was his fear of the dangers connected 
with the recent use of democracy in the world. In a section 
of his autobiography dealing with On Liberty, Mill states 
that this essay expressed fears that the growth of social 
equality and of the government of public opinion might im-
pose on mankind an oppressive yoke of uniformity in opinion 
d . 11 an pract1.ce. 
Next to On Liberty, this sentiment of Mill's is prob-
ably most clearly presented in his essay on Tocqueville's 
Democracy In America. In this essay, Mill discusses the 
tendency of democracy towards bearing down on individuality, 
10John Stuart Mill, "Selections From Principles Of 
Political Economy," Limits Of Liberty, ed. Peter Radcliff 
(Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1966), p. 64. 
11 
Idem, Autobiography of John Stuart Mill, pp. 177-178. 
8 
and circumscribing the exercise of the human faculties with-
. 1' . 12 1n narrow 1m1ts. Mill says that there must be steps 
taken to prevent this: 
To sustain the higher pursuits of philosophy 
and art; to vindicate and protect the unfettered 
exercise of reason, and the moral freedom of the 
individual--these are purposes, to which, under a 
Democracy, the superior spirits, and the govern-
ment so far as it is permitted, should devote their 
utmost energies.l3 
As indicated earlier, it is in On Liberty where Mill 
develops most fully his defense of individuality against the 
potential tyranny of mass democratic society. In the first 
chapter of On Liberty, Mill states the object of the essay: 
The object of this Essay is to assert one very 
simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely 
the dealings of society with the individual in the 
way of compulsion and control, whether the means 
used be physical force in the form of legal penal-
ties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That 
principle is, that the sole end for which mankind 
are warranted individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of arzion of any of 
their number, is self-protection. 
12Idem, "M. De Tocqueville on Democracy In America," 
in The Philoso h of John Stuart Mill: Ethical, Political 
and Religious, ed. Marshal Cohen New Yor : The Modern 
Library, 1961), p. 168 
13Ibid., pp. 168, 169. 
14Idem, On Liberty, p. 9. 
9 
Now, of course, the question arises about the basis 
for this principle. Why does Mill assert the liberty of the 
individual against societal coercion? If Mill's argument in 
On Liberty is to be considered consistent, I believe there 
are only two possible responses. One response is rather 
obvious. If Mill is a utilitarian, as he professes to be, 
then it can be argued that individual freedom and the self-
development that can derive from such freedom is defended 
because it will in some way promote happiness. The other 
response is that in On Liberty Mill abandons his commitment 
to utilitarianism and instead sets up the development of 
individuality as his highest and controlling principle. 
Individuality is valued for itself. 
There are several sources that one can go to which 
would seem to support the first response, that Mill's argu-
ment in On Liberty is based on utilitarian principles. 
Indeed, in On Liberty itself Mill seems to indicate that 
the basis of his argument in the essay is founded in the 
principles of utility: 
It is proper to state that I forgo any advantage 
which could be derived to my argument from the idea of 
abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. I 
regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical 
questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, 
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a pro-
gressive being. Those interests, I contend, authorize 
the subjection of individual spontaneity to external 
control, only in respect to those actions of5each, which concern the interest of other people. 
15 . Ib~d., pp. 10, 11. 
10 
Ostensibly, Mill never abandoned his allegiance to 
utilitarianism. The fact that Mill affirmed his allegiance 
to utilitarianism in works written after On Liberty weighs 
against the argument of those who contend that in On Liberty 
Mill abandons his commitment to utilitarianism and sets up 
self-development as his highest and controlling principle. 
For example, as already indicated, in his autobiography, 
which was written after On Liberty, Mill affirmed his commit-
"1" . . 16 ment to ut~ ~tar~an~sm. Indeed, Utilitarianism, the book 
in which Mill explains his version of social utility, was 
written after On Liberty. 
Not surprisingly, then, there are scholars like Alburey 
Castell who maintain that Mill's argument in On Liberty is 
based on utilitarianism. Castell states that liberty is 
d f d d h d f . . 1 "1" 17 s k" e en e on t e groun s o lts soc~a ut~ ~ty. pea ~ng 
of On Liberty, Castell says: 
It contains a defense of the individual's right to 
think and act for himself. It says, by way of pre-
mise, that all human action should aim at creating, 
maintaining, and increasing the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number of people. Actions are right 
when they do that; wrong when they do not. A good 
society is one in which the greatest possible number 
of persons enjoy the greatest possible amount of 
16Idem, Autobiography of John Stuart Mill, p. 100. 
l7Alburey Castell, Introduction to On Liberty by 
John Stuart Mill (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1947), 
p. viii. 
11 
happiness. It says, secondly, that one of the most 
important ways for society to ensure that its members 
will be able to contribute their maximum to creating, 
preserving, and increasing the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number is to ext!Yd them the right to 
think and act for themselves. 
Castell's analysis seems quite reasonable if one as-
sumes that in On Liberty Mill does not deviate from his 
commitment to happiness as the highest good. Indeed, one 
can point to numerous examples in On Liberty where Mill's 
argument is based on utility. His stance in chapter two in 
favor of freedom of opinion and freedom of expression seems 
to be based more upon the usefulness to society of permit-
ting such freedom rather than on any intrinsic value to 
such freedom. Indeed, I do not think that it can be denied 
that On Liberty is filled with examples of the utilitarian 
value of the development of individuality. 
However, there is a problem. There are instances in 
On Liberty where it would appear that happiness is not the 
highest good. At times, one gets the impression that for 
Mill the highest good is self-development. Individuality 
seems to be valued for itself without any connection to 
utility. 
Mill seems more concerned about self-development than 
happiness when he looks with favor upon this quote of 
18 
Ibid., p. vii. 
12 
Wilhelm von Humboldt: 
"The end of man, or that which is prescribed by 
the eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and not 
suggested by vague and transient desires, is the 
highest and most harmonious development of his powers 
to a complete and consistent whole;" that, therefore, 
the object "towards which every human being must 
ceaselessly direct his efforts, and on which especially 
those who design to influence their fellow men must 
ever keep their eyes, is the individuality of power 
and development"; that for this there are two requisites, 
"freedom, and variety of situations"; and that from 
the union of these arise "individual vigor and manifold9 diversity," which combine themselves in "originality."! 
The fact that Mill looks with approval upon the state-
ment by Wilhelm von Humboldt is quite significant. The chief 
end for man described in this quote is self-development, not 
social utility. 
As indicated already, On Liberty is filled with passages 
which seem to indicate that the highest and controlling prin-
ciple for Mill is individuality and not utilitarianism. Mill 
decries the lack of high regard for individuality in society: 
But the evil is, that individual spontaneity is hardly 
recognized by the common modes of thinking, as having 
any intrinsic worth, or deserving any regard on its 
own account. The majority, being satisfied with the 
ways of mankind as they now are (for it is they who 
make them what they are), cannot comprehend why tho~O 
ways should not be good enough for everybody; ... 
19John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, p. 57. 
20Ibid., p. 56. 
This statement by Mill is rather important. He is 
critical of the fact that the mass of men are satisfied 
13 
with a society in which there is an absence of individuality. 
The only logical conclusion from this statement is that Mill 
preferred individuality more than happiness. Richard Licht-
man makes this observation about this statement by Mill: 
Mill here makes the crucial admission that the 
mass of mankind is satisfied with the human condition 
as it now stands--that is, that their happiness is 
apparently compatible with the absence of freedom. 
The possibility of a conflict between happiness and 
freedom has actually materialized. In the third 
chapter, Mill is commending the doctrine of individ-
ual free devel2~ment against the mediocre satisfaction 
of the masses. 
Chapter four of On Liberty provides another example in 
which Mill seems to value the free development of individual-
ity over utilitarian concerns: 
But with regard to the merely contingent, or, as 
it may be called, constructive injury which a person 
causes to society, by conduct which neither violates 
any specific duty to the public, nor occasions percep-
tible hurt to any assignable individual except himself; 
the inconvenience is one which society can afford to 
bear~2for the sake of the greater good of human free-dom. 
It appears that what Mill is saying in this passage is that 
the contentment of the mass of people in society is to be 
21Richard Lichtman, "The Surface and Substance of Mill's 
Defense of Freedom," Social Research 30 (1963): 486. 
22 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, p. 82. 
14 
given less consideration than the freedom of the individual. 
This is not a statement one would expect from a utilitarian. 
Such a statement would be expected from one who sets up the 
development of individuality as his highest and controlling 
principle. 
C. L. Ten, in an article entitled "Mill on Self-Regard-
ing Actions," makes some similar observations. Ten makes 
reference to some of Mill's argument in chapter four of On 
Liberty. Ten points to the situation presented by Hill in 
which the overwhelming majority in a society feel strongly 
about the private conduct of a small group of people, and 
demand that the latter be fined or imprisoned for a short 
time. Ten maintains that there would be a good utilitarian 
reason for punishing that private conduct. However, it is 
this type of thing that Mill indicates in On Liberty that he-
wants ruled out. In Mill's example in the fourth chapter of 
the prohibition on the eating of pork and in other similar 
examples, Mill indicates concern about how hopeless the case 
for liberty would be if the majority's genuine feelings of 
horror and repugnance are recognized as having a claim to 
. . d . 23 ser1ous cons1 erat1on. 
23c. L. Ten, "Mill on Self-Regarding Actions" in On 
Liberty by John Stuart Mill, ed. David Spitz (New York:---
W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1975), p. 244. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE PROBLEM OF SOLVING THE PARADOX 
There is a problem then. Mill professes to be a util-
itarian, yet certain passages in On Liberty seem to indicate 
that he has abandoned his commitment to happiness as the 
greatest good and sets up self-development in its place. 
Mill seems at times to value individuality for itself with 
no connection to happiness. There is a paradox. Numerous 
scholars have presented interpretations of On Liberty which 
would seemingly solve this dilemma. As indicated earlier, 
these scholars generally take one of two views. Some say 
that Mill's defense of individuality in On Liberty is based 
on its utilitarian value. Then, there are those who contend 
that Mill's argument in On Liberty shows ultimately that 
Mill's highest and controlling principle is self-development 
and not utility. Therefore, it is not inconsistent for Mill 
to argue in On Liberty as if he valued individuality for it-
self because for Mill the highest good actually is self-
development and not the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number. For reasons that shall become apparent, I reject 
both views. It is my contention that there is no valid way 
to conclude that Mill is consistent in On Liberty. To accept 
this position, however, I think it is necessary to examine 
the argument of some scholars on this issue. 
15 
Robert Paul Wolff suggests a solution to the dilemma 
that one is faced with in On Liberty. Discussing Mill's 
argument as it develops in On Liberty, Wolff says: 
16 
On some occasions, he seems to say that the free devel-
opment of individual tastes and inclinations is a 
valuable means to the end of happiness . . . . At 
other times, his language suggests that individual 
expression is itself a satisfying experience and 
hence one of the ends of life, not merely a means 
to some end. The truth, most probably, is that Mill 
personally valued individuality for itself, but felt 
it necess~ry to defend it to the world by a utilitarian 
argument. 4 
Wolff's proposition is very appealing. It provides an 
answer to the paradox that one faces in On Liberty. Indeed, 
there is one passage in chapter three which would seem to 
verify Wolff's proposition: 
Having said that Individuality is the same thing 
with development, and that it is only the cultivation 
of individuality which produces, or can produce, well-
developed human beings, I might here close the argu-
ment: for what more or better can be said of any 
condition of human affairs, than that it brings human 
beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can 
be? or what worse can be said of any obstruction to 
good, than it prevents this? Doubtless, however, 
these considerations will not suffice to convince 
those who most need convincing; and it is necessary 
further to show, that these developed human beings 
are of some use to the undeveloped--to point out to 
those who do not desire liberty and would not avail 
themselves of it, that they may be in some intelligible 
manner rewarded for allowing other people to make use 
of it without hindrance.25 
24Robert Paul Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1968), p. 26. 
25John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, pp. 63, 64. 
17 
The implications of this statement seem to support 
Wolff's proposition. Mill seems to value individuality for 
itself. However, to convince others of its value, he feels 
he must show its utility. 
Wolff's proposition provides an appealing solution to 
the paradox that one faces in On Liberty. Mill is really 
not inconsistent when he writes as if individuality is the 
highest good and an end in itself, while at the same time 
professing that he is a utilitarian because he feels the 
need to show the utilitarian value of individuality to the 
mass of men. 
I, however, cannot accept this position. In a way, 
what Wolff has done is to turn the tables on the argument. 
Utility is now used as a means to support the end of indiv-
iduality. I do not believe that it is valid to say that Mill 
ultimately valued utilitarianism merely as a means. This is 
in direct opposition to what Mill has explicitly said about 
utilitarianism. Indeed, in On Liberty itself and in books 
written after it, Mill has made quite clear his commitment 
to utility as the highest good and the end of life. Before 
I could accept the proposition presented by Wolff, I would 
have to have an explanation of why, if Mill really consid-
ered utility as a means to support individuality, would he 
make it quite clear in both Utilitarianism and in his auto-
biography that he considered utility as the chief end 
in life. An explanation concerning this is particularly 
relevant considering that both books were written after On 
Liberty, the book upon which Wolff bases his proposition. 
I do not believe that it is really possible for Wolff to 
come up with an explanation. I think that Mill makes it 
particularly clear in his autobiography about his commit-
ment to utilitarianism. Mill talks of the mental crisis 
which he had to face. Mill states that he resolved the 
crisis still committed to the principle that he was always 
committed to, which is, of course, ~tility. 26 
18 
Robert Ladenson presents quite a different proposition 
than does Wolff. Ladenson argues that Mill does not deviate 
in his allegiance to utilitarianism in On Liberty. Laden-
son's argument is worthy of study because, like Wolff's 
proposition, it presents an appealing answer to the contra-
dictions that one is faced with in On Liberty. Speaking of 
Mill's contentions in On Liberty, Ladenson says: 
... we have a sophisticated, yet unmistakeably, 
utilitarian argument for the desirability of cul-
tivating individuality, and derivatively for liberty 
of action. To asseflble all the premises: 
(1) To cultivate individuality is to develop 
certain qualities, for example, observation, 
judgment, discrimination, firmness of will, 
and so on, that are the distinctive endow-
ment of a human being. 
26 Idem, Autobiography of John Stuart Mill, p. 100 
(2) Such qualities are instrumental in discerning 
or desiring what is best, and thus, in the 
proportion to which people have them they 
become more valuable to themselves and are 
therefore capable of being more valuable 
to others. 
19 
(3) For a utilitarian (a) "what is best" is what 
is most productive of happiness, and (b) some-
thing is valuable to the extent that it is 
productive of happiness. 
(4) Accordingly, such qualities are abilities 
and capacities which, far more than any 
other aspect of human individuals, enable 
them to promote both their own happiness 
and the happiness of others. 
Therefore, 
(5) Individuality ought to be cultivated. 
In light of the foregoing, the defense of liberty of 
action in chapter three is likewise utilitarian in 
character, namely, 
(6) Liberty of action is necessary for the cultiva-
tion of individuality. 
(7) From a utilitarian standpoint, the cultivation 
of individuality is highly desirable. 
Therefore, 
(8) There ought to be liberty of action. 27 
Ladenson's argument, like Wolff's, presents a solution 
to the paradox. Essentially what Ladenson is saying is that 
Mill supports individuality because it promotes the utilitar-
ian goal of happiness. Individuality is simply a means to 
27Robert F. Ladenson, "Hill's Conception of Individ-
uality," Social Theory an:d Practice 4 (1977): 175. 
20 
the end of happiness. This kind of reasoning leads one to 
the conclusion that there is no inconsis.tency in On Liberty. 
It is natural for Mill, a professed utilitarian, to defend 
self-development because it promotes happiness. 
I, however, do not accept Ladenson's argument. Laden-
son maintains that, for Mill, individuality serves as a 
means for the utilitarian end. This, however, is not con-
sistent with some things that Mill says in On Liberty. As 
indicated earlier, there are some passages in which Mill 
seems to value individuality not as a means to some higher 
end, but an end in itself. Those passages make it appear 
that the highest and controlling principle for Mill is self-
development and not utilitarianism. As I said before, there 
are passages which indicate that Mill gives preference to 
the free development of individuality over the satisfaction 
of the masses. Finally, there is that one passage in chapter 
three of On Liberty which I quoted in my discussion of Wolff's 
argument, which seems to indicate that Mill presents the 
utility of individuality as a means to get the mass of man-
kind to accept the end of self-development. I do not think 
it can be said that Ladenson's argument offers a viable sol-
ution to the paradox. 
Maurice Cowling, in his book Mill and Liberalism, 
argues that, for Mill, the development of individuality 
21 
serves the end of utility. Cowling's argument in support of 
this conclusion is rather complicated. Cowling's interpre-
tation of what Mill means by happiness is rather crucial to 
his argument. From this interpretation, Cowling builds his 
argument that individuality is essentially a means for the 
end of utility. 
Cowling maintains that when Mill speaks of happiness, 
he is not referring to any happiness which the individual 
might happen to desire. Cowling contends that when Mill 
speaks of happiness, he means the happiness that rational 
reflection would approve. ·Happiness is referred to in an 
. 28 
elevated sense. 
This notion of elevated happiness that Cowling dis-
cusses can be easily related to some of Mill's discussion 
in Utilitarianism. As noted earlier, Mill argues in Utili-
tarianism that it is compatible with the principle of util-
ity to recognize a qualitative distinction among pleasures 
as well as a quantitative distinction. There are "higher 
pleasures." Those pleasures which employ the higher facul-
ties and pleasures of the intellect are of higher value. 29 
28Maurice Cowling, Mill and Liberalism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp, 31,32. 
29John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, pp. 11,12. 
22 
Cowling in his book argues that Mill defends the free 
development of individuality in On Liberty because it serves 
as a means to achieving the elevated or higher pleasures: 
The demand for liberty is not the assertion of a 
fundamentally binding end, but the designation of 
a means to the end--the end of allowing men to 
approach as close as possible to that highest of 
all pleasures which comes from mental cultivation 
of the closest approximation possible to knowledge 
of what is true.30 
Cowling makes it quite clear in the fifth chapter of 
his book that the free development of"individuality serves 
the utilitarian end of "higher happiness." 
General utility for Mill means, as we know, 
maximization; not of any happiness, but of the 
higher happiness, the freedom of men to engage 
in rational pursuit of disinterestedness and 
truth. Maximization of the higher happiness 
comes when men are left free (from mediocre social 
pressure) to reflect on, and choose, the right 
action rather than the wrong one.31 
I think it is necessary at this point to be quite clear 
about Cowling's understanding of Mill's utilitarian end. The 
end, of course, is the elevated pleasure derived from ration-
al pursuit. It is important to note that this notion of 
rational pursuit is not without bounds. Something more 
3°cowling, p. 42. 
31Ibid., pp. 101, 102. 
specific is intended here: 
Mill, then, is offering persuasion, not to a 
vulgarly libertarian position, but to a unitary 
ethic, based on a unitary noetic, which assumes 
neither that methods of right reasoning are various 
and diverse, nor that there will be ultimate diver-
gence about its injunctions. It assumes, on the 
contrary, that, given liberty to reflect and free-
dom from pressure of mediocrity, the higher minds 
will use their liberty (and the lower minds, per-
haps, even theirs) to play their part in estab-
lishing a disinterestedly utilitarian ethic which 
will have been validated by agreed philosophical 
procedures . . . . Mill assumes that, given as 
wide a freedom as possible to exercise rational 
choice and taking this freedom as the means, the 
end will be achieved, not of diversity of opinion 
pure and simple, but diversity of opinion within 
the limits of a rationally homogenous, agreed, 
social concensus about the meth~2 of judging and 
the right end to be approached. 
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Cowling connects Mill's utilitarian end with the devel-
opment of a rational concensus in society. Liberty and 
individuality are not valued for themselves, but because 
they provide a situation in which a rational concensus for 
. 33 
society can be developed by the el~te. 
The best way of achieving a rational concensus, 
in other words, is to leave men as free as 3~ossible to be led into it by a rational education. · 
32
rbid., pp. 43, 44. 
33
rbid., pp. 103-105. 
34rbid. • p. 103. 
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Cowling states that Mill defends the freedom to develop in-
dividuality, where no assignable damage is done to others by 
the use of that freedom, because then the only way to maxi-
mize utility is to leave men's minds absolutely open to the 
working of rational education. It is only through rational 
education that unforced assent to the right means of deter-
35 
mining the right course of action will take root. 
According to Cowling, those of genius quality or the 
elite play a key role in the development of the rational 
concensus that he talks about. Considerations about the 
elite are of great importance to Mill's argument in On Lib-
erty. Cowling implies, in fact, that Mill's defense of the 
free development of individuality is tied to the fate of the 
elite: 
But Mill was attempting in On Liberty to protect 
the elite from domination by mediocrity. How he 
would have applied his principles in a system where 
the elite had triumphed, and to what extent it 
could have operated individualistically where a 
rational concensus had prevailed, is another ques-
tion. On Libert!, in the form in which it was 
written, so farrom being an attempt to free men 
from the impositions of all doctrine, is an attempt 
to free them from customary, habitual, conventional 
doctrine. Convention, custom and the mediocrity of 
opinion are the enemies in Mill's mythology: the 
freedom he gives is given in order to subject men's 
prejudices to reasoning authority. On Liberty does 
not offer safeguards for individuality; it is de-
signed to propagate the individuality of the elevated 
by protecting them against the mediocrity of opinion 
35
rbid., p. 103. 
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as a whole ... the purpose in allowing men liberty, 
the justification of individuality, is not diversity 
in itself, but diversity informed by the rationally 
agreed education the clerisy alone can provide. Edu-
cation is desirable and self-development an obliga-
tion, because both maximize the same part of happiness. 
Mill, in short, feared democracy and loved individual-
ity, not so much_ because individuality would induce 
diversity, but because, by breaking up existing rigid-
ities, it would make the world safe for "rational" 
education, "rational" thinkine and the assured leader-
ship of the "rational clerisy."36 
Cowling's argument presents the possibility of another 
interesting solution to the paradox that one is faced with 
in On Liberty. Cowling associates Mill's "higher pleasures" 
with the pursuit of the rational concensus. Therefore it 
could be argued that Mill's defense of individuality in On 
Liberty is not inconsistent with Hill's commitment to utili-
tarianism. It is by the free development of individuality 
that man can develop rational pursuit. I, however, reject 
the solution which develops out of Cowling's argument. 
Cowling's argument still restricts individuality to a 
means which serves the utilitarian end. As indicated already, 
this is inconsistent with parts of On Liberty in which it 
&ppears that Mill views self-development as an end in itself 
and his highest and controlling principle. 
Cowling's argument could develop into a proposition 
such as the following: It is not inconsistent for Mill, a 
36Ib1."d.. 104 105 , pp • I • 
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professed utilitarian, to defend individuality as if it 
were a good in itself because the higher pleasures can be 
equated with the pursuit of rationality which implies self-
development. I have serious problems with such a proposi-
tion. In Hill's revised definition of utilitarianism, 
happiness is still the end. Mill state.s that what he means 
by happiness is pleasure and the absence of pain. Pleasure 
and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as 
37 
ends. To be consistent, then, with Hill's argument in 
Utilitarianism, it would have to be maintained that Mill 
values self-development because of its connection to pleasure. 
Man may experience a "higher pleasure" or a more valuable 
pleasure from "the manner of existence which employs their 
higher faculties." 38 However, what is still desired as an 
end is pleasure, not the use of the higher faculties or self-
development. The "higher pleasures" are sought after because 
they provide pleasure, not because they are "higher pleasures." 
Therefore, the proposition that I presented is fallacious. 
Mill's notions about utilitarianism are inconsistent with 
parts of Or, Liberty in which he indicates that self-develop-
ment is the highest good and an end in itself. For Mill to 
37 
"11 "1" . . M1. , Ut1. 1.tar1.an1.sm, p. 10. 
38Ibid. , p. 12. 
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remain consistent with his definition of utilitarianism, the 
only thing that could be considered an end in itself is 
pleasure or happiness. However, as shown earlier, there are 
sections in On Liberty where Mill indicates that he would 
sacrifice the pleasure or happiness of the many to preserve 
the individuality of the few. This is certainly not consis-
tent for even Mill's revised utilitarianism. 
Cowling's discussion concerning the importance of the 
elite in On Liberty is a crucial part of his argument. Mill 
defends the free development of individuality because he 
desires to protect the elite from domination by mediocrity. 
A rational concensus can then be developed under the leader-
ship of the elite. This result serves utility. Once again, 
individuality is reduced to a means. Cowling, in fact, 
voices uncertainty about Mill's concern for the free devel-
opment of individuality in a society where the elite has 
triumphed. 
From this reasoning it can be concluded that it is not 
inconsistent with utilitarianism for Mill to defend individ-
uality as he did in On Liberty. In a society where individ-
uality is protected, there is then provided a situation in 
which the elite are free to attempt to lead the way to a 
rational concensus which serves utility. 
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Once again, I must say that I reject this solution to 
the paradox that one faces in On Liberty. It cannot be 
denied, however, that Mill places great value upon those 
talented few of genius quality. He refers to these few as 
the salt of the earth. He states that without them, human 
life would become a stagnant pool. Genius, however, can 
39 
only exist in an atmosphere of freedom. 
In one passage particularly, Mill emphasizes the im-
portance to society of a talented elite: 
No government by a democracy or a numerous aristocracy, 
either in its political acts or in the opinions, qual-
ities, and tone of mind which it fosters, ever did or 
could rise above mediocrity, except in so far as the 
sovereign Many have let themselves be guided (which in 
their best times they always have done) by the counsels 
and influence of a more highly gifted and instructed 
One or Few. The initiation of all wise or noble things, 
comes and must come from individuals; generally at 
first from some one individual. The honor and glory 
of the average man is that he is capable of following 
that initiative; that he can respond internally to wise 
and nzsle things, and be led to them with his eyes 
open. 
It cannot be denied then that Mill places great value 
on a talented elite. However, it cannot be said that Mill 
defends self-development simply because it creates a situa-
tion in which the elite will be free to develop a rational 
39Idem, On Liberty, p. 64. 
40Ibid., p. 66. 
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concensus in society and therefore serve utility. Too many 
parts of On Liberty are inconsistent with this conclusion. 
Those passages in On Liberty in which it seems that Mill 
considers self-development an end in itself and the highest 
good would appear to invalidate Cowling's conclusion that 
Mill defends individuality to protect the elite from domin-
ation. There are instances where Mill defends individuality 
as a good in itself with no apparent connection to the tal-
ented elite. 
There is one passage in On Liberty in which it is 
indicated that Mill values self-development as his highest 
end. However, to protect free self-development, Mill indi-
cates that he feels the need to show to the mass of mankind 
the utility of individuality. This passage was quoted dur-
ing my discussion of Wolff's argument. What is important is 
that immediately after this passage Mill presents his discus-
sion about the value of a talented elite for society. This 
certainly would seem to show that Mill values individuality 
irregardless of its connection to the elite. 
Some of Mill's argument in chapter two of On Liberty 
I think creates some serious doubts about Cowling's position 
that Mill values liberty and individuality not for themselves 
but because they provide a situation in which a rational con-
census can be developed by the elite. Mill, in chapter two. 
30 
argues that liberty to dissent against the received opinion 
41 is the whole truth. This seems to indicate that Mill 
would cherish individual liberty even if the elite were 
successful and did lead society to some type of rational 
concensus. 
It would seem, then, that Cowling's argument does not 
present a solution to the paradox. I believe that I have 
shown the invalidity of the proposition that Mill's concern 
for individuality is based on its connection to the devel-
opment of a rational concensus by the elite which serves the 
utilitarian end. What Cowling has presented does not con-
vince me that Mill's utilitarianism is not inconsistent with 
some of his defense of self-development that he presents in 
On Liberty. 
41Ibid., pp. 15-54. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
As I indicated early in my thesis, there are basically 
only two ways in which Mill can be considered consistent in 
his argument in On Liberty. One way is to argue that Mill 
supports individuality because it serves the utilitarian end 
which he professes to be committed to. The other way is to 
maintain that in On Liberty, Mill abandons utilitarianism 
and instead takes up self-development as an end in itself 
and the highest good. Neither side has proved its case; the 
paradox still exists. 
Wolff, Ladenson, and Cowling present, I believe, the 
more plausible solutions to the paradox. However, as indi-
cated, there are flaws in each argument. Therefore, there 
is only one conclusion that I think is valid. It is, that 
Mill in On liberty is inconsistent. Parts of On Liberty are 
inconsistent with Mill's professed utilitarianism. However, 
there is no indication that Mill abandoned his commitment to 
utility. In On Liberty itself and in books written after it, 
Mill explicitly reaffirms his commitment to utilitarianism. 
Mill appears to have allegiance to two inconsistent ends. 
He does not appear to be settled on what is his highest and 
controlling principle, self-development or utility. 
31 
32 
Any conclusion that Mill is not inconsistent in On 
Liberty I am afraid is doomed to repudiation. I do not 
believe that there is basis in text for any other conclusion. 
I believe my handling of the sophisticated arguments of 
Wolff, Ladenson, and Cowling supports this. 
I have found nothing written by Mill which solves the 
paradox. Mill makes statements in Utilitarianism, in his 
autobiography, and in his Essay on Bentham which indicate 
that it is not inconsistent for a utilitarian to pursue an 
end other than happiness for itself. In fact, Mill indicates 
that the only way to achieve happiness is not to seek it 
directly. However, Mill makes the point that in reality, 
nothing is desired except happiness. Mill states that what-
ever is desired otherwise than as a means to some end beyond 
itself is desired as itself as a part of happiness. It is 
not desired for itself until it has become so. Those who 
desire an end for its own sake desire it either because the 
possession of it is a pleasure, or because the absence of it 
42 
is a pain. In other words, the only thing ultimately de-
sirable as an end is happiness. 
The paradox that one is faced with in On Liberty, I 
am afraid, is permanent. Mill is inconsistent. Any other 
response I think would be conjecture and not based on text. 
42 
Idem, Utilitarianism, p. 48. 
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